Monocular image parameter-based aircraft sense and avoid by Bauer, Péter et al.
THIS IS THE AUTHOR VERSION OF ARTICLE PUBLISHED AT IEEE MED'15 CONFER ENCE ( c©IEEE) 1
Monocular Image Parameter-based Aircraft Sense and Avoid*
Peter Bauer1, Balint Vanek1, Tamas Peni1, Anna Futaki2, Borbala Pencz1, Akos Zarandy1 and Jozsef Bokor1,3
Abstract— This paper deals with the problem of monocular
image parameter-based sense and avoid. It considers image
parameters as decision variables and selects decision thresholds
related to collision and non-collision scenarios. The main contri-
bution is non-heuristic threshold selection. Another contribution
is the characterization of possible intruder threats with size-
speed curves given in closed form formulae. This makes it
possible to avoid the use of lookup tables. The overall decision
and avoidance concept is evaluated in a software-in-the-loop
simulation campaign considering threats ranging from small
UAV to large airliner. The miss detection rate of the method
is zero which is an excellent result, however the false alarm
rate is high. The causes of this are pointed out and targeted as
further developments. Finally, promising results are presented
executing the method for real camera images.
Index Terms— Sense and avoid, Monocular camera, Image
parameter, Threshold selection, Test campaign
I. INTRODUCTION
Sense and avoid (S&A) capability is a crucial ability for
the future unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). It is vital to
integrate civilian and governmental UAVs into the common
airspace according to [1] and [2]. At the highest level of
integration (called Dynamic Operation in [2]) Airborne Sense
and Avoid (ABSAA) systems are required to guarantee
airspace safety.
In this ﬁeld the most critical question is the case of non-
cooperative S&A for which usually complicated multi-sensor
systems are developed (see [3] for example). However, in
case of small UAVs the size, weight and power consumption
of the onboard S&A system should be minimal. Monocular
vision based solutions can be cost and weight effective
therefore especially good for small UAVs [4], [5], [6], [7].
These systems basically measure the position (bearing) and
size of intruder aircraft (A/C) camera image without range
information. [5] introduces a collision detection method
based only on intruder bearing and size. However, the
method is implemented with heuristic threshold selection
through Monte Carlo simulations (10.000 cases) and repeated
avoidance maneuvers can occur for the same threat because
of non proper thresholds.
The current article targets to derive a similar method with
non-heuristic threshold selection using the possible minimum
number of system parameters and avoiding time consuming
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simulations for tuning. The theoretical results are applied
to select appropriate thresholds and a software-in-the-loop
(SIL) simulation campaign is conducted to evaluate perfor-
mance. Additionally an avoidance maneuvering strategy is
proposed and implemented. Finally, ﬁrst experiences with
real camera images are evaluated.
The article is divided into eight sections. Section II sum-
marizes the derived methodology for threshold selection.
Section III characterizes considered own craft categories,
airspace segments and intruder categories accordingly to-
gether with S&A system effectiveness requirements. Section
IV introduces the SIL test environment. Then section V se-
lects the detection thresholds and section VI summarizes test
results. VII evaluates the ﬁrst camera experiences. Finally
section VIII concludes the paper.
II. SUMMARY OF PROPOSED METHODOLOGY
The applied basic notations (image parameters) are shown
in Fig. 1.
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Fig. 1. Considered image parameters
In XC , YC , ZC camera frame x, y are the positions of
intruder image centroid (IIC) and Sx, Sy are the intruder
image sizes (IIS) (horizontal / vertical). A pinhole camera
model is used which relates image parameters (x, y, Sx, Sy)
to own aircraft camera focal length f , intruder position
(X, Y, Z) in camera frame, intruder size Rx/y (horizontal
/ vertical), intruder relative velocities Vx, Vy, Vz in camera
frame, time to collision tTC (deﬁned to go to zero as the
aircrafts approach each other), miss distances at Z=0 Xa, Ya
and relative miss distances CPA = Xa/Rx or Ya/Ry
(called closest point of approach CPA). The basic equations
of pinhole camera model are:
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(1)
Considering the intruder relative velocities and tTC the
above expressions can be reformulated and their derivatives
derived. From now, formulae are presented only for the x
horizontal direction because the y direction formulae are
structurally the same.
x = −f
(
Rx
Vz
CPA
tTC
− Vx
Vz
)
, Sx = −f Rx
Vz︸︷︷︸
RV
1
tTC
dx
dt
= − f
Vz
Xa
t2
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= −fRV CPA
t2
TC
,
dSx
dt
= −fRV 1
t2
TC
(2)
In a S&A scenario the miss distance Xa should be
estimated. This would be possible from (dx/dt)/(dSx/dt)
if the intruder size Rx were known. However, it is unknown.
Inspecting closer the ratio (derived also in [8]):
dx/dt
dSx/dt
=
Xa
Rx
= CPA (3)
CPA well characterizes the miss distance relative to intruder
size. This is a perfect parameter for collision estimation. If
CPA = 0 mid-air collision (MAC) is sure. If 0 < CPA <
CPAc (below a selected threshold) near mid-air collision
(NMAC) can be deﬁned. dx/dt and dSx/dt can only be
estimated from measured x and S (from now Sx will be
denoted as S and Rx as R for simplicity) and so they can
be noisy and this could lead to false CPA estimates. On the
other hand |dx/dt|  0 is good indicator of non-collision
and |dS/dt| → ∞ of collision. So, detection thresholds
x˙LIM and S˙LIM should be selected for them. The proposed
threshold selection methodology is summarized below.
1) Decide about the collision decision time tTC = tCdec
required to be able to execute the avoidance maneuver
in safe distance from the intruder. This depends on own
craft dynamics and intruder velocity.
2) Determine S˙LIM to decide about collision based-on
dS/dt
3) Determine tSdel and txdel decision delays because of
camera image pixelization and sampling ('noises').
4) Decide about the CPAC limit, below which all the
scenarios should be decided to be NMAC (including
MACs also).
5) Determine x˙LIM based on CPAC and the derived
formulae.
6) Determine CPANC limit above which all the scenar-
ios are determined to be non-collision.
The next section characterizes own craft and possible
intruder threats so setting the parameter space for tuning of
methodology. The steps will be explained in detail in section
V.
III. CHARACTERIZATION OF POSSIBLE SCENARIOS
In this development the own craft is considered as the
Aerosonde UAV which model was constructed based on [9].
Its cruise speed ranges between 17 and 23 m/s obtained from
the simulation of the model.
The possible airspace categories are selected based on
[10] which makes an important effort to set S&A system
effectiveness standards considering different class of UAVs
and airspaces. The targeted airspaces by current development
are Class D/E and G which does not require on-board
transponder or ATC link. The targeted own craft categories
are Group 1 to 4 (micro to tactical). The overall S&A system
effectiveness requirement laid down in [10] ranges from
30.9% to 68.9% for these categories. So, this target should
be satisﬁed by the proposed algorithm if possible.
Considering the possible threats, in Class D/E airspaces
the intruder aircrafts can range from micro UAVs through
general aviation (GA) aircraft until large airliners / trans-
porters on their approach to airports. So, these types should
be characterized. [10] characterizes A/Cs based-on their
weight and speed, however from a vision sensor point of
view it is better to use size and speed. Wingspan (b), fuselage
length (L) and cruise speed characteristics were collected
from [11] ranging from CAP-10 to Airbus A380 and AN-
225 including also helicopters. At ﬁrst, the relation between
wingspan and fuselage length was examined (rotor diameter
and fuselage length). It is almost linear, so an average
size ((b + L)/2) can well characterize the A/Cs (from now
including helicopters also) and is used in the sequel. At the
next step the size-speed characteristic was plotted as shown
in Fig. 2. A least squares optimal size-speed curve was
ﬁtted on the data and the minimum and maximum deviations
were characterized by simple functions generating boundary
curves for the plotted points applying trial and error. From
this, the speed range of a given size of A/C can be calculated
in closed form. Below R=7m size, only UAVs are assumed
with min./max. speeds as 10m/s and 40 m/s respectively.
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Fig. 2. Aircraft size-cruising speed characteristics. The crosses represent
original data
The average speed from A/C average size (middle curve in
Fig. 2):
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Vi0 = 8.75 · 10−4R3 − 0.177 ·R2 + 12 ·R− 30.7
The positive maximum deviation from Vi0 (upper bound):
∆V + = 15 if R ≤ 5
∆V + = 15 + 12(R− 5) if 5 < R ≤ 13
∆V + = 111 if 13 < R < 21
∆V + = 111e−(R−21)0.05 if 21 ≤ R
(4)
The negative maximum deviation from Vi0 (lower bound):
∆V − = −15 if R ≤ 7
∆V − = −15− 6(R− 7) if 7 < R ≤ 23
∆V − = −111 if 23 < R < 35
∆V − = −111e−(R−35)0.045 if 35 ≤ R
(5)
This way the intruder velocity ranges can be characterized
depending on the size of intruder. However, the RV term
in (2) strongly depends on the direction of intruder relative
to own craft because Vz = Vo + Vi cos(β) cos(α) is only
a component of relative speed. Here α and β characterizes
direction of the intruder as shown in Fig. 3.
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Fig. 3. Angles in collision scenario
Consequently RV can be characterized as follows:
RV =
R
Vo + Vi cos(β) cos(α)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Vz
= k
(
R
Vo + Vi
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
RV 0
(6)
However, β and α can not be measured from image parame-
ters, β′ and α′ are measured instead (see formula with f, x, y
below). Later a numerically approximated lower bound kb
will be applied instead of k:
cos(β′) cos(α′) =
f√
f2 + x2
f√
f2 + y2
kb =
1
(cos(β′) cos(α′))0.8
≤ k
(7)
After summarizing own craft and intruder characteristics the
SIL simulation environment used in the test campaign is
brieﬂy introduced.
IV. SIL SIMULATION ENVIRONMENT
A simulation environment is built in Matlab Simulink to
generate collision and non-collision scenarios and apply the
proposed methodology together with avoidance maneuvers.
Fig. 4. Intruder 3D model (only the vertices are considered)
In the simulated scenarios the following assumptions and
methods are applied:
• Intruder is in front of own craft (inside ±75◦ horizontal
(α), ±30◦ vertical (β) ﬁeld of view)
• Both own craft and intruder ﬂy straight paths with
constant velocity before avoidance starts.
• Only one intruder threatens until the conﬂict is solved.
• The intruder is non-cooperative and is not equipped with
S&A system
• A ﬁxed onboard monocular camera is applied with
pixelization errors and sampling (∆t = 0.07s means
about 14-15 fps of the real camera [12]) in intruder
image centroid (IIC) and size (IIS).
• The intruder can range from small UAV to large trans-
port or airliner.
• The own craft attitude is known without errors.
• Own craft motion is completely simulated with autopilot
performing waypoint tracking and avoidance if required.
• A pinhole camera model is applied considering the
transformations between earth, body and camera frame.
A 3D vertex set is applied to model the intruder (see
Fig. 4) which is scalable to different sizes. Sx and Sy
are obtained as maximum horizontal / vertical sizes
of the vertex set in image plane (see Fig. 1). Another
assumption is the unlimited ﬁeld of view of camera.
• Ego motion of own craft was compensated in (x, y)
centroid position but was not compensated in intruder
size (Sx, Sy).
• The intruder motion is simulated without orientation and
velocity changes because otherwise the miss distance
can become different because of intruder dynamics.
• Intruder directions are considered in the ranges β =
−75 : 25 : 75◦, α = −30 : 15 : 30◦ and the miss
distances are deﬁned as Da = R0 · scl · CPA (R0 =
1.2m) in given directions (left/right up/down) from own
craft characterized by τ as shown in Fig. 5. scl is the
scale from R0 intruder size to R.
Of course real situations can violate some of these assump-
tions the examination of these cases should be the topic of
future work.
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Fig. 5. Intruder ﬂight directions (in own craft camera system)
V. FORMULAE BASED THRESHOLD SELECTION
Assume ﬁrst that S˙LIM and x˙LIM are selected. Then the
collision (C) and non-collision (NC) decision times can be
calculated from the continuous functions (2):
tCdec =
√
−f · kRV 0/S˙LIM
tNCdec =
√
−f · kRV 0CPA/x˙LIM
(8)
However, pixelization and sampling will cause delays in
the violation of thresholds S˙LIM and x˙LIM and this should
be considered in their selection. The scheme for this can be
seen in Fig. 6.
txdel tSdel
tCNCdec
CPA < CPAC
tCdectNCNCdec
CPA > CPANC
Fig. 6. Overall scheme of threshold selection
Here, tCdec is the time of collision decision (time (tTC)
when it is decided that A/Cs are on collision path) and
tSdel is its maximum delay. tCNCdec is the time of false non-
collision decision if aircrafts are in MAC / NMAC scenario.
It should never be before tCdec to guarantee 100% collision
detection. tNCNCdec is the time of non-collision decision if
aircrafts are out of NMAC range. It should never be after
tCdec (that means false collision decision), its worst case
delay is txdel. Of course there will be a hysteresis between
guaranteed collision (CPA < CPAC) and non-collision
(CPA > CPANC > CPAC) decisions by this scheme
(note that time to collision decreases from left to right in the
ﬁgure). The proposed threshold selection methodology (see
section II) is implemented step by step in the sequel.
To select the required collision decision time (tCdec) the
avoidance strategy should be determined. [5] proposes to turn
towards the intruder if collision is detected. This is a suitable
strategy for non-cooperative intruders w/o S&A equipment.
In this work it is completed with a return strategy to original
path. In case of collision detection the own craft turns
towards intruder until it is at +80◦ or −80◦ in horizontal
ﬁeld of view. Then it tracks the intruder with this +/− 80◦.
If own ﬂight direction is again towards the original path the
controller switches to track the path again.
tCdec can be selected by simulating (measuring for real
A/C) the turning maneuver of own craft (time required to
90◦ turn and distance from collision point at end of turn) and
considering possible intruder speeds and required minimum
distance. The level turns of Aerosonde were simulated for
17, 20 and 23 m/s in the SIL environment. Fig. 7 shows
the turning paths together with the original straight path and
possible collision points (C) as intersections of straight path
and horizontal lines for the different velocities.
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Fig. 7. Turning paths of Aerosonde
4 seconds were enough for 90◦ turn in all cases and
the collision points are about 20m away from turned A/C
in X direction. Simulation calculations were made with
R = 0.5 : 0.5 : 80m intruder sizes and the corresponding
minimum, middle and maximum intruder speeds from Fig.
2 considering β = 0 : 75◦ and all three own craft trajectories
from Fig. 7. The intruder was simulated to ﬂy to the collision
point without avoidance with its actual velocity and β
direction starting from time 4s before collision. The distance
between own craft and intruder trajectories was calculated at
every 0.01s. The absolute min. distance resulted as 38m for
small size intruders, so the avoidance was estimated to be
acceptable in every case.
Thus decision at tCdec > 4s guarantees that collision
can be avoided. However, the horizontal limit distance for
NMAC is given as about 150m for GA A/C in [13]. So, this
minimum distance should be guaranteed in avoidance (38m
is not satisfactory) (GA wingspan is about 10m, so 150m
is about CPA=15). In case of small UAV intruders 20m is
decided to be guaranteed as minimum (with 1m wingspan
this is CPA=20). To increase safety it is assumed that own
craft is in line with the collision point after 4s and 90◦ turn.
This means 0m X distance from the C points in Fig. 7. Thus
tCdec > 4s should be applied to guarantee limit distances.
Own craft maximum speed is 23m/s. For UAV intruder
R = 1m the maximum speed is Vi = 40m/s. To have
guaranteed 20m minimum distance after 4s turn tCdec should
be increased by 20/63 ≈ 0.3s to tCdec = 4.3s. For GA
intruder R = 7.5m is the minimum size and Vi = 72m/s is
the maximum speed. To have 150m minimum distance tCdec
should be increased by 150/95 ≈ 1.6s to tCdec = 5.6s.
Examining tCdec in (8) shows that the S˙LIM0 thresh-
old should be determined with minimum k (min(k) =
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min(kb) = 1) and min(RV 0) because increase in either
k or RV 0 will increase tCdec for a given S˙LIM0 and so
makes an earlier collision decision. Minimum RV 0 means the
minimum of RVo+Vi . Considering the given maximum speeds
S˙LIM0 = f ·min(RV 0) 1
t2
Cdec
= 0.51
results for UAV and S˙LIM0 = 1.51 for GA intruder.
Selecting the smaller one and considering the effect of k
as kb gives ﬁnally:
S˙LIM = kb · S˙LIM0 = kb · 0.51
The decision criterion to determine x˙LIM is (here tCNCdec
is the decision time of non-collision based on dx/dt thresh-
old violation):
tCdec − tSdel > tCNCdec
where
tCNCdec =
√
−fkRV 0CPAC/x˙LIM
tSdel ≤ (max(r) + 1)∆T
r =
−t2 +
√
t22 + t2∆T +
∆t
∆T t
2
2 + t2∆t
∆T
∆T =
t2Cdec
−fkRV 0 + tCdec
t2 = tCdec +∆T
(9)
The above formulae can be derived considering pixelization
and sampling of the dS/dt curve but the details are omitted
because of space constraints. x˙LIM can be calculated con-
sidering worst case values for k and RV 0. First max(r) is
determined for tCdec with k = kb because tCNCdec moves
together with tCdec if k changes (their ratio is always
the same see (8)). So an RV 0 sweep is done considering
R = 0.5 : 0.5 : 80m and adding the minimum and
maximum velocities from Fig. 2 to the minimum (17 m/s)
and maximum (23 m/s) own velocities. This way four curves
are obtained for possible r values and plotted against R.
The worst case is the overall maximum which resulted to be
max(r) = 0.766. The criterion for x˙LIM selection ﬁnally
becomes (S˙LIM = kb · S˙LIM0 is substituted into tCdec):
√
−f(k/kb)RV 0/S˙LIM0 − 1.766∆T >
>
√
−fkRV 0CPAC/x˙LIM
∆T =
−f(k/kb)RV 0/S˙LIM0
−fkRV 0 +
√
−f(k/kb)RV 0/S˙LIM0
√
x˙LIM >
√
CPAC
√
kfRV 0kbS˙LIM0 +
√
kbS˙LIM0√
kfRV 0
√
kbS˙LIM0 − 0.766
(10)
The coefﬁcient of
√
CPAC should be maximal to obtain
worst case results. However, it is a complicated expression
so numerical calculations are required to determine the maxi-
mum. A sweep calculation is done for k (kb is considered as
a parameter) and RV 0 considering R = 0.5 : 0.5 : 80m,
adding the minimum and maximum velocities from Fig.
2 to the minimum (17 m/s) and maximum (23 m/s) own
velocities and considering also α = −30 : 10 : 30◦ and
β = −90 : 10 : 90◦ intruder ﬂight angles (see Fig. 3).
These calculations show that the minimum
√
kfRV 0 value
gives the maximum for the coefﬁcient of
√
CPAC . This
minimum is obtained as min(
√
kfRV 0) = 2.1822 and this
results in the following ﬁnal expression (substituting also
S˙LIM0 = 0.51):
√
x˙LIM >
√
CPAC
1.1129kb +
√
0.51kb
1.5584
√
kb − 0.766
CPAC = 10 was selected as the limit of collision cases (15
and 20 limits were decreased to not to be over conservative),
below this the situation should be considered as NMAC. The
kb parameter range considering α = −30 : 30◦ and β =
−75 : 75◦ and all the possible intruder velocities from Fig.
2 together with the Vo range results as kb = 1 : 4.064. This
leads to an x˙LIM range of:
x˙LIM = 53.18 : 63
The next step is to determine CPANC above which a
non-collision decision is guaranteed. This requires to know
the worst case time delay in tNCNCdec called txdel. dx/dt is
estimated by ﬁtting a quadratic function x ≈ xf = a2s2 +
a1s+a0 to the measured x values on a given moving horizon
N . From now t will denote time to collision which goes to
zero, and s will denote the real time which goes to inﬁnity.
One to one correspondence is deﬁned between t and s with
the same indices. Given an actual time instant si xf is ﬁtted
to data x (si−N−1) : x (si) , N ∈ Z and (dx/dt)|ti ≈
dxf/dt = 2a2si + a1.
The time delay for dx/dt can be estimated from the
difference between dx/dt (see (2)) and dxf/dt = 2a2si+a1.
Fitting the function xf = a2s2 + a1s + a0 to x = 1/t
on a horizon N and comparing dxf/dt = 2a2si + a1 to
dx/dt = 1/t2i will characterize the errors. At ﬁrst, ti = tCdec
should be selected, then ti should be increased by ∆t steps
(shifting the whole N horizon) until 2a2si + a1 > 1/t2i
is achieved. The number of required steps Mmax gives the
time delay txdel = Mmax∆t. Doing this calculations around
tCdec = 4s with N = 20 resulted in Mmax = 2 so
txdel = 2∆t = 0.14s.
From the relations
tNCNCdec − txdel > tCdec
tNCNCdec =
√
−fkRV 0CPANC/x˙LIM
(11)
CPANC can be easily determined.
√
−fkRV 0CPANC/x˙LIM − 0.14 >
>
√
−f(k/kb)RV 0/S˙LIM0
√
x˙LIM <
√
CPANC
√
fkRV 0
√
S˙LIM√
fkRV 0 + 0.14
√
S˙LIM
(12)
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Here, the minimum coefﬁcient for
√
CPANC should
be selected. It is obtained with S˙LIM = S˙LIM0 and
min(
√
kfRV 0) = 2.1822 as:
√
x˙LIM <
√
CPANC0.68286
Considering this result and x˙LIM = 53 : 63 leads to
CPANC = 113.7 : 135.1 which seems to be too large. The
large x˙LIM values result from the large worst case tSdel.
Modifying tSdel to be: tSdel = ∆T (instead 1.766∆T ) we
get ﬁnally from tCdec − tSdel > tCNCdec:
√
x˙LIM >
√
CPAC
(√
S˙LIM +
1√
kfRV 0
)
Again the maximum coefﬁcient is required on the right
hand side and this ﬁnally leads to:
√
x˙LIM >
√
CPAC
(√
0.51kb + 0.4593
1√
kb
)
Selecting CPAC = 20 (to somehow compensate smaller
tSdel and return back to originally required CPA=15-20)
results in lower bounds x˙LIM = 28 : 56 and CPANC =
59 : 119. Meanwhile calculating CPAC from the formula
with larger tSdel (10) considering x˙LIM = 28 : 56 gives
CPAC = 5.2 : 8.8 so, this modiﬁed threshold selection
will guarantee collision detection for CPAC < 5 and non-
collision detection for CPANC > 120. In the hysteresis part
a transient is expected with decreasing number of collision
and increasing number of non-collision decisions. The SIL
simulation campaign is also conducted to decide about the
real CPAC limit if it is 5 or above.
VI. TEST RESULTS
In the simulation campaign the own craft velocity was 20
m/s, intruder sizes R =
[
1.2 5 10 20 40 60
]
m were
considered (from small UAV to large airliner / transport) with
β and α ranges listed in section IV. τ was cyclically varied
using a counter from τ =
[
0◦ 90◦ 180◦ −90◦] values.
Avoidance maneuver was executed if required. The percent
of collision (C) decisions relative to the number of simulated
cases is summarized in Table I.
The results show that there is no miss detection until
CPA=20 (well above the worst case theoretical value 5)
which is the selected non-conservative CPAC limit. For
CPA=60 and 120 the number of collision decisions decreases
as expected. For CPA=120 theoretically all cases should be
non-collision which means that there the percent is the ratio
of false alarms (FAs). This is between 0 and 51.4%. The
latter is a very large FA rate.
Examining the causes of such a high ratio of FAs resulted
in the following two observations:
1) The intruder sizes Sx and Sy are not ego motion
compensated and this results in latent size velocities
which could violate the threshold and cause a FA.
Removing the ego motion from the simulation (own
craft orientation is ﬁxed) decreases the FA rates for
CPA=120 between 0 and 28.6%. This is better but also
not acceptable.
2) The formulae for S and dS/dt are developed in [8]
for a length R line segment moving parallel with the
image plane. On the contrary the simulation includes
a 3D vertex set which is projected to the image plane,
this can lead to differences mainly for intruders coming
from large β and α directions. To prove this assump-
tion simulations were conducted for the case with
28.6% FA rate applying a rectangle moving parallel
with the image plane as intruder. The FA rate decreased
to 0%.
TABLE I
SUMMARY OF TEST RESULTS: PERCENT OF C DECISIONS
R [m] Vi [m/s] CPA
0 10 20 60 120
17 100 100 100 0 0
1.2 20 100 100 100 6 0
23 100 100 100 0 0
10 100 100 100 40 0
5 25 100 100 100 34 3
40 100 100 100 31 11.4
37 100 100 100 45.7 25.7
10 64 100 100 100 37.1 17.1
127 100 100 100 34.3 17.1
52 100 100 100 66 46
20 145 100 100 100 40 26
256 100 100 100 34.3 22.9
133 100 100 100 57.1 51.4
40 222 100 100 100 48.6 34.3
265 100 100 100 45.7 31.4
205 100 100 100 57 40
60 241 100 100 100 48.6 43
257 100 100 100 51.4 37.1
A possible solution is to increase S˙LIM0 with heuristic
tuning until it preserves the detections (no miss detect for
small CPA) but decreases FA rate. A better solution can
be the ego motion compensation for intruder sizes and the
derivation of S and dS/dt formulae for complicated 3D
intruder shapes.
Considering the miss detection rate (0%) the 70% required
effectiveness is well satisﬁed. The only future task is to
decrease FA rate.
VII. FIRST CAMERA TEST RESULTS
First test results were obtained with a ground ﬁxed camera
towards which a small RC aircraft has ﬂown several raids.
An example screenshot from observation to close intruder
can be seen in Fig. 8.
Results from a close to collision and a non-collision
scenario are shown in Fig. 9, 10 and 11 considering the same
time span for the plots. All image processing is done as in
the simulations except for ego motion compensation because
camera is ﬁxed and so ego motion is zero. The thresholds
are also calculated considering kb as in (7).
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Fig. 8. Screenshots with real camera (left side: observation, right side:
close intruder)
Fig. 9 shows that the motion of intruder in image is much
smaller for raid 3 than for raid 1, so raid 3 can be a close
to collision situation.
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Fig. 11. Decision variables and limits, raid 3
Fig. 10 shows that for raid 1 both dx = dx/dt, dSx =
dSx/dt and dSy = dSy/dt exceeds the thresholds at the
calculation of ﬁrst nonzero values (denoted by circles). This
case (if all thresholds are violated) the algorithm considers
the case as non-collision. In case of raid 3 (Fig. 11) dSx
and dSy exceed the threshold immediately and dy = dy/dt
exceeds it later (ﬁrst values out of the thresholds are denoted
by circles). This leads to a collision decision. So, the
decisions are correct, however larger thresholds would be
better to make the decisions later not at the ﬁrst nonzero
derivatives. Possibilities will be examined in the future for
larger set of test data.
VIII. CONCLUSION
This paper develops and tests a non-heuristic threshold
selection method for image parameter-based aircraft sense
and avoid . First, it summarizes the theoretical basis and the
proposed steps of threshold selection. Then it characterizes
own craft and possible intruder threats considering real
aircraft data ranging from GA to large airliner / transport. It
derives closed form relations between aircraft characteristic
sizes and velocities considering minimum and maximum
velocity bounds also. It also selects the appropriate S&A
system effectiveness requirement based-on [10]. After char-
acterizing the possible threats the main properties of the
applied SIL simulation environment are listed.
The main part of the paper executes the derived formulae
following step by step the proposed threshold selection
methodology. It determines the guaranteed collision and non-
collision decision ranges considering relative miss distance
(CPA).
Results from the simulation campaign are summarized in
a table. The miss detection rate of the method is 0% which is
an excellent result. On the contrary the false alarm rate can
be as large as 51.4% which shows that the method is over
conservative. The cause of this is the lack of ego motion
compensation for intruder image size and the application of
more simple formulae for image size change then required.
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First results with real camera images are also presented
applying a ground based camera and a small RC aircraft as
intruder. The results are promising, near collision and non-
collision scenarios can be well distinguished.
The further developments should target the following
topics:
• Solve ego motion compensation of intruder image size
and make the related formulae more accurate if possible.
• Consider limited camera ﬁeld of view and also effective
ﬁeld of view (see [14]) in intruder observation and
during avoidance maneuver.
• Propose solutions when intruder is non-cooperative but
also equipped with S&A system. Some right hand rule
or other should be introduced to avoid crashes if all two
aircrafts execute avoidance.
• Detailed camera test with more scenarios and airborne
camera.
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